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Abstract
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an internationally used instrument that measures an individual’s moral
reasoning skills—that is, how an individual explains right and just action. DIT scores are correlated
with age and education, and they are also correlated with clinical performance when administered to
professional practitioners. Practicing signed language interpreters’ scores, however, were not reflective of
their age and education in one study, being much lower than those of practitioners from other professions.
Providing communication access for individuals who do not share the same language as their service
providers is grounded in social justice and equity, yet practicing interpreters’ DIT scores did not reflect
higher-order justice skills. The current study investigates American Sign Language interpreting students’
DIT performance. Over the course of 3 years, different classes of third-year interpreting students in an
undergraduate program in the United States took the DIT. Each year, the students’ average scores were
significantly higher than those of working interpreters (n = 80). This result raises the question of whether,
how, and why years of interpreting experience curtail ethical development. A follow-up study with one
student class (n = 32) also found that taking the DIT as a collective, meaning that answers were negotiated
among group members, resulted in higher scores than the group members’ individual median scores.
This additional finding adds credence to educational approaches that focus on ethical discussion and
deliberation of interpreting practice.
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1. Introduction
During an interpreting faculty meeting a few years ago, the topic of students accepting professional work in the
community while still in the interpreting program was raised. Interpreting faculty address this concern with some
frequency: How do we instill in students the importance of discernment regarding their qualifications—when to
accept or not accept an interpreting assignment—now and in the future?
Within the context of this conversation, one faculty member relayed a distressing conversation she had had
with students a couple of weeks prior: “I asked the students how they should determine whether or not they accept
an interpreting assignment.” She went on to contrast two responses in particular. One student suggested that they
would consider the impact on the deaf and hearing people. Another student admitted that it was their availability
that would determine whether they accepted the assignment: “I just ask myself, does this fit my schedule, and if it
does, I would accept it.” This response caused the entire faculty to groan with frustration.
How an individual reasons through a decision to reach what they imagine is right and just action is of interest to
moral psychologists (Gilligan, 1977; Kohlberg, 1976; Rest et al., 1999). Moral psychologists have proffered theories
and empirical data for what constitutes an ethically defensible reason as well as what makes some reasoning patterns
better than others (Rest et al., 1999). In more than 100 years, more than 20 instruments have been created and used
to measure moral judgment, moral reasoning, and moral development (Martí-Vilar et al., 2021).
One of the top two measures used in the last 30 years is the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Martí-Vilar et al., 2021).
The DIT measures an individual’s pattern of moral reasoning and has been used with professional practitioners in
the fields of teaching, medicine, business, and law (Christensen et al., 2016; Rest, 1994; Roche & Thoma, 2017). The
DIT more recently has been used to measure the moral reasoning abilities of American Sign Language–English
(ASL-ENG) interpreters in the United States (Dean, 2015), the results of which reveal moral reasoning patterns
commensurate with individuals in their teenage years, more than half of the average age of the study participants.
Teenagers and young adults (~ age 22) on average demonstrate a moral reasoning pattern that is concerned with
following rules or social conventions. The results of this initial study beg the question of why these interpreters have
not developed beyond this stage. This current study investigates whether student interpreters, representative of the
teenage to young adult category, show similar reasoning patterns to their peers and to practicing interpreters.

2. Stages and Schemas of Moral Reasoning
At the interpreting faculty meeting described above, no one felt the need to question what was wrong with the
second student’s response or why the first student’s response was better. The faculty all just seemed to tacitly agree
that the first was acceptable and the second wasn’t. Kohlberg’s (1976) six stages of moral development readily explain
why the faculty assessed each student’s response differently. Kohlberg’s six stages include a notable hierarchical
nature to ethical reasoning, from preconventional to postconventional. Table 2.1 defines Kohlberg’s moral stages
(Rest 1994, p. 5).
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According to Kohlberg, the second student’s response of “Does this fit my schedule?” would be indicative of
the preconventional stages, where the focus is on the self and limited to only those who are known (i.e., kinship).
In other words, an individual in the preconventional stage might ask, “What’s in it for me and my ingroup?” By
being concerned about the impact the decision could have on others, the first student demonstrated a type of
postconventional reasoning. Postconventional reasoning, or principled reasoning, as it is also called, is concerned
with shared values; these individuals might ask, “How can I cooperate?”
There was not a third student in this anecdote, but as a means of completing the illustration, imagine a student
reasoning at the conventional stages. They might have offered, “I should only accept work based on those in authority;
if my boss says I should take it, then I should.” Those in the conventional stages tend to ask, “What is the rule, and
what is my duty?”
What Kohlberg’s theory does not account for is why one 20-something-year-old college student was reasoning at
an age typical of preadolescence while the other 20-something was reasoning at a level theorized to be beyond their
years (Rest et al., 1999). According to Kohlberg (1976), these similarly aged individuals should have been drawing on
a shared moral stage and, as a result, should have reflected similar reasoning abilities. Indeed, 20-somethings tend to
fall into the conventional stages of moral development, but neither of these students gave a conventional response—
the conventional response was created and added for the purposes of illustration.
The moral psychologist James Rest was a former doctoral student of Lawrence Kohlberg. Along with scores of
other graduate students, Rest helped advance the empirical value of Kohlberg’s instrument, the Moral Judgment
Interview (MJI). In the MJI, participants are offered a hypothetical scenario of an overarching social nature, asked
what the character in the scenario should do, and then queried for their reasoning behind the proposed ethical
action. The participants’ moral reasoning statements are then coded based on Kohlberg’s six stages.
Years later, Rest’s own research would address some of the weaknesses apparent in Kohlberg’s research design
and protocol (Rest et al., 1999). The first of those weaknesses was the concept of stages. Kohlberg’s notion that
individuals follow along a steplike, age-based series of stages as they mature was not compelling and not sufficiently
evidenced in the data. Rest instead proposed moral schemas. Although schemas are not completely irrespective of
age, he found that all individuals (old enough to be verbal) have the capacity to think and reason in preconventional,
conventional, and postconventional ways. Instead of Kohlberg’s six stages, Rest proposed three schemas that still
include the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional categories. Table 2.2 lists Rest’s moral schemas,
descriptors for each, and how they correspond to Kohlberg’s stages (Narvaez & Bock, 2002).
Table 2.2: Rest’s Moral Schemas
Rest’s Moral Schemas			

Schema Features				

Personal Interest			
Arbitrary or negotiated cooperation		
						Self-focused
						
Advantage to self is primary
						Survival orientation
						Scope includes known others
						In-group reciprocity

Compared to Kohlberg
Stages 2 & 3

Maintaining Norms			Need for norms					Stage 4
						Self-focused
						Uniform categorical application
						Partial society-wide reciprocity
						Duty orientation
Postconventional			
Appeal to an ideal				
						Sharable ideals
						Primacy of moral ideal
						Full reciprocity
						Rights orientation
International Journal of Interpreter Education, 14(1), 17-31. © 2022 Conference of Interpreter Trainers
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Although all individuals have the capacity to draw on any of the three schemas while thinking and reasoning
ethically, as they move through life stages (e.g., age, education, life experience), individuals develop a dominant
schema—one that is more consistently relied upon (Rest, 1994). Deviations from that dominant schema would be
expected when particular situations are encountered. For example, a person could be dominant in postconventional
reasoning, but when faced with a particular topic and the decisions associated with that topic (e.g., military service
or diet and exercise), they might reason at a level more reflective of the maintaining-norms schema. Emotional
states, such as anxiety and fear, can also shift an individual’s dominant schema. Rest’s research showed that dominant
schemas do tend to cluster around age and education, but there is also potential for deviation from those trends.

3. Tacit Processes
Rest (1994) also proposed that moral schemas function tacitly, or beyond one’s awareness. As a result, when an
individual is asked directly to reason or to justify their proposed ethical action (like with the design of Kohlberg’s
MJI), they may struggle to express their reasoning. For example, in the scenario above, the faculty collectively
expressed their frustration at the reply of “If it fits my schedule. . . .” They all appeared to be agreeing that the first
response (concern for the impact of the decision) was more ethically compelling than the second (a concern for
personal circumstances and benefits). No explanations were needed; tacitly, the faculty agreed with the morally
superior response.
However, if someone had asked what was wrong with the second student’s answer, the tacit nature of moral
schemas would have become more evident. Some might have only replied, “Isn’t it obvious?”; others could have
explained how concerns for others morally supersede concerns for the self. This variation in response is not necessarily
because of variations in moral reasoning abilities but in verbal abilities (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). In other words, the
ability to articulate tacit reasoning is linked more to verbal skills than to reasoning skills (Rest et al., 1999).
In Kohlberg’s MJI research, the protocol was to collect spontaneous responses and measure them. Kohlberg’s
MJI instrument uses hypothetical scenarios and poses the questions of “What should be done?” and “Why is that the
right thing to do?” However, decades of data collection did not produce sufficient evidence of participants’ ability
to reason at the most sophisticated Stages 5 and 6, or postconventional reasoning. In what would eventually be called
Kohlberg’s fatal flaw, Kohlberg’s data were thought to be representative of verbal skills and not reasoning skills (Rest,
1994).
Kahneman (2011) sums up this phenomenon by explaining that moral reasoning “requires a richer vocabulary
than is available in everyday language” (p. 4). Without access to or use of such vocabulary, it can be argued that what
a person is drawing on is just what is cognitively available (Kahneman, 2011) and not necessarily reflective of their
actual abilities. What becomes cognitively available to an individual depends on the kinds of normative messages
that they have directly or indirectly acquired (Dean, 2014, 2015).
Normative messages—being told directly or indirectly what is right and wrong—are ubiquitous. For professionals,
normative messages about effective and ineffective practices are found in formal and informal sources—that is, they
can be found in sanctioned documents and expressed through common tropes (e.g., “You’re just the interpreter”). They
come from a profession’s ethical codes and standards of practice documents and are equally acquired from the “ethical
parlance adopted by educators and the discursive norms and heuristics used by practitioners” (Dean, 2015, p. 96).
In one study, I (Dean) identify a series of normative messages prevalent in signed language interpreting textbooks
and in interpreting discourse. Normative messages can sometimes morph into heuristics or mental shortcuts.
Heuristics help the brain simplify ethical issues into rules of thumb and, by doing so, intimate solutions (Kahneman,
2011):
[I]n order to function, the brain creates heuristics allowing for cognitive ease, to think and respond
quickly. Heuristics [are] “simple procedures that help find adequate, though often imperfect, answers
to difficult questions” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 98). Therefore, it is likely that . . . normative messages would
function as an availability heuristic for [sign language interpreting] students. (Dean, 2014, p. 65).
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Consider the heuristic of “better safe than sorry”—something we might say to ourselves or to each other when faced with
a decision. This heuristic distills the complexity of the decision and proposes two possible outcomes—being safe or not
being safe, and in not being safe, experiencing regret. The solution further intimated by the heuristic is “choose whichever
leads to safety.” Consider the statement “You’re just the interpreter,” which is sometimes used in the interpreting field
and similarly can function as a heuristic. “You’re just the interpreter” implies that whatever the expressed concern is, in
actuality, should be of no concern to you. The solution is further implied from this simplification—if it should be of no
concern to you, then you should do nothing, not address it, or take no action.
Doing nothing, taking no action, and the like are common themes found in the ethical content material used in
interpreter education (Dean, 2014). Interpreting texts and interpreting discourse reveal a series of normative messages
that can be summarized as: When faced with a decision to take action or not take action, interpreters should almost always
not take action. Exceptions include those associated with effective message transfer (e.g., not hearing the speaker), the
preferences and directives of the deaf person (e.g., “Please don’t interrupt the speaker”), or those resulting in untoward
consequences, as in life-or-death decisions (see Dean, 2014, p. 65, for a more detailed description).
If you ask a person why they consider a particular decision to be ethically correct, you are more likely to access what
they are verbally capable of than what they are morally capable of—that is, they might have the tacit ability to think and
function in a more sophisticated way than what they can express. Moreover, what they are verbally capable of may well
be informed by those normative messages that are elicited from stimuli, such as familiarly themed ethical scenarios or
ethical dilemmas.

4. Ethical Scenarios in Interpreting Education and Research
Posing ethical scenarios, dilemmas, or cases (real or made-up) as a means of eliciting dialogue on decision making
and reasoning is a common educational technique in professional ethics (Hill, 2004). Although it is also common in
interpreter education (Cartwright, 2009; Dean, 2014; Drugan & Megone, 2011; Humphrey, 1999; Seal, 1998), some
have highlighted the kinds of problems that occur with overreliance on this teaching technique (Dean, 2014; Marin,
2020; Wilbeck, 2017).
Ethical scenarios typically focus on the boundaries between right and wrong (Hill, 2004), requiring the decision
maker to consider only two obvious choices: Do this and don’t do that. This type of ethics education only advances
mandatory minimal standards of a profession’s ethics (Hill, 2004). As a result, ethical dilemmas “do very little to
advance ethical awareness . . . [or] conversations [that] foster and ensure effective practice” (Dean, 2014, p. 62). The
use of ethical dilemmas might also lead to a type of defensive practice (Hill, 2004), causing practitioners to await
and expect some ethical breach (Dean, 2015). As a result, practitioners “might limit their behaviour even more
severely than necessary and thus fail to serve their client’s best interests” (Hill, 2004, p. 140; see also Turner & Best,
2017). Posing ethical scenarios is not only an educational technique; it is used as a means of assessing interpreters’
professional ethical knowledge and skills (as in education and professional accreditation), and it is used as a research
tool.
Collecting data through discussion of ethical scenarios or ethical dilemmas is a popular technique in interpreting
research (Bergson & Sperlinger, 2003; Dean & Pollard, 2009; Stewart & Lindsey, 1990; Tate & Turner, 2002; Thomas,
2012). Often, the respondents’ spontaneous speech or self-explanation is prompted by a scenario, and then that
speech is recorded and analyzed for ethical thought and reasoning. In other instances, in vivo interpreted situations
are observed and followed up by interviews about interpreters’ actions to collect and analyze the interpreters’ ethical
thoughts and reasonings (Hsieh, 2007, 2009).
Mendoza’s (2012) study used surveys and interviews to investigate the ways in which novice and expert ASL-ENG
certified interpreters discuss how they make ethical decisions. In the second part of the study, Mendoza interviewed
six of the survey participants and asked them to recall and report on an actual interpreting situation from their own
practice. They were asked to consider those situations that highlighted one of the tenets of the professional ethical
code, such as confidentiality, impartiality, professionalism, or business practices. Mendoza then compared their
responses, three from the novice group (3 years and under of interpreting experience) to three of the expert group
International Journal of Interpreter Education, 14(1), 17-31. © 2022 Conference of Interpreter Trainers
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(having more than 10 years of experience). Mendoza found that the novice group was limited in their assessment of
the ethical dilemma (i.e., lacking complexity), while the expert group explored greater nuance. The expert group was
able to discuss how consequences of decisions would affect all individuals in the situation, whereas the novice group
appeared to be more self-focused.
Posing ethical scenarios to elicit ethical responses is a common educational, assessment, and research tool.
Research data that rely on the verbal data of participants need to be interpreted carefully. If ethical reasoning skills
are indeed being measured through these data, then there may be concerns for research validity. The data need to be
critiqued in light of what might be a function of verbal skills as well as how those verbal skills might be influenced
by what is made cognitively available (Dean, 2014).

5. Rest’s DIT
The DIT, now in its second iteration (DIT-2), was developed by Rest (1986) as an alternate measure of individuals’
reasoning skills. Similar to the MJI, the DIT proposes ethical scenarios and follows each scenario with a series of
questions. Also similar to the MJI, the research participant is queried for the optimal ethical action, but instead of
having to rely on their verbal skills to explain their reasoning, they are given verbal assistance (Narvaez & Bock,
2002) in the form of a series of argumentation statements for each of the five scenarios. As such, the DIT’s design is
based on the participant’s ability to recognize and affirm compelling rationales for their chosen ethical action. This is
done by the participant’s rating (a Likert scale of importance from 1 to 5) and ranking each of the 12 argumentation
statements and choosing the top four most compelling.
The Center for the Study of Ethical Development (CSED; n.d.) explains the DIT’s design rationale:
A common assumption in the field of morality, and one with which we disagree, is that reliable
information about the inner processes that underlie moral behavior is obtained only by interviewing
subjects. Contrary to assuming that interviewing presents a clear window into the moral mind,
researchers in cognitive science and social cognition contend that self-reported explanations of
one’s own cognitive process have severe limitations. There is now a greater appreciation for the
importance of implicit processes and tacit knowledge on human decision making, outside the
awareness of the subject and beyond his or her ability to verbally articulate them.
For example, consider this frequently cited example, the Heinz Scenario. In summary, Heinz’s wife is dying
from a disease. The druggist in town has invented a medicine that will save the wife, but his price is too high. Heinz
cannot raise the money. He is faced with the moral choice of whether or not to steal the drug. Sample argumentation
statements offered to respondents to rate and rank include the following:
•
•
•

It really depends on how much Heinz likes his wife and how much risk there is in taking the drug. If
he can’t get the drug in another way, and if he really likes his wife, he’ll have to steal it.
Regardless of his personal feelings, Heinz has to realize that the druggist is protected by the law.
Because no one is above the law, Heinz shouldn’t steal it. If we allowed Heinz to steal, then all of
society would be in danger of anarchy.
I think that a husband would care so much for his wife that he couldn’t just sit around and let her die.
He wouldn’t be stealing for his own profit; he’d be doing it to help someone he loves.

Listed here are only three sample argumentation statements. In the DIT-2, each scenario has 12 to be rated and
ranked. The argumentation statements are devised to reflect features of Rest’s moral schemas: personal interest (PIS),
maintaining norms (MNS), and postconventional (PCS).
The DIT is administered and scored by the CSED in the United States. Since the 1970s, the CSED has collected
thousands of DIT scores on an international level. Multiple indices are offered for validity (see also Thoma & Dong,
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2014). The DIT is correlated with age, education, and clinical performance; it is not correlated with personality trait
measures, IQ, or socioeconomic status (CSED, n.d.). In a recent study, the DIT was found to be one of the top two
most used moral development measures (Martí-Vilar et al., 2021).
Three types of scores are returned to the researcher: the P-score, the Type Indicator, and the Utilizer Score. The
P-score, or the principled reasoning score, is the score that most researchers report. It accounts for the degree to
which a respondent endorses statements indicative of PCS, the most sophisticated schema. The P-score is reported
in percentages, as are the reports of the other two schemas, PIS and MNS. Whichever percentage is the highest of the
three (PIS, MNS, PCS) is the respondent’s current dominant schema. As mentioned earlier, these do tend to cluster
around age and education. Table 5.1 shows the average scores on the normed data based on education.
Table 5.1: Average P-scores, based on age and education
Grade level		

Average PIS		

Average MNS		

Average PCS

Grades 10–12		27.7%			35.3%			31.6%
Undergraduate		25.0			35.1			35.1
Graduate		20.6			34.1			41.1
The numbers for PIS and MNS decrease based on age and education, while the PCS score increases. This is an
expected response to increasing age and educational attainment.
Table 5.2 lists the normed data for students in professional education and practitioners, including two anchors for
comparison: seniors in high school (~ age 18) and adults in general.
Table 5.2: Normative data for students in professional education and practitioners
P-score			Group
65.2			
Moral philosophy and political science graduate students
52.2			Law students
50.2			Medical students
49.2			Practicing physicians
46.3			Staff nurses
42.3			
College students in general
40.0			
Adults in general
31.8			
Senior high school students
In addition to collecting normed data on students and professionals, the DIT has been used to measure the
efficacy of ethics education in a pre-test/post-test measured design (Bebeau, 2002; Mayhew et al., 2014). McGeorge
(1975) used the DIT to investigate the hierarchical nature of ethics reasoning, examining whether respondents are
able to will themselves to do worse (they can) or better (they can’t) than their own score. In other words, respondents
can fake low, but they can’t fake high.
The DIT has also been used to determine whether working together as a collective produces better scores
(i.e., higher P-scores) than the scores achieved when those individuals take the DIT alone (Dukerich et al., 1990;
Nichols & Day, 1982). This latter design of individual versus collective scores is of particular interest to interpreter
education for a couple of reasons. First, ethics education is often conducted by using real or constructed ethical
scenarios to prompt ethical discussions among a group of students, typically in an ethics or practicum seminar
class, or among interpreter practitioners during a professional development event. Both of these designs are based
on the idea that two heads are better than one when it comes to ethical reasoning. Yet if such a hierarchy in moral
International Journal of Interpreter Education, 14(1), 17-31. © 2021 Conference of Interpreter Trainers
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reasoning exists, do those who reason at higher levels pull up those who reason at lower levels, resulting in an
influential modeling of advanced abilities? Or does the opposite occur, with those who are reasoning at an advanced
level being pulled down? In other words, maybe two heads are not better than one.

6. The DIT and Interpreters
In 2013, 25 American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters agreed to take the DIT-2. This cohort was a subset of the
approximately 65 participants involved in a related qualitative study (Dean, 2014 & 2015). Although the qualitative
data collected from this study revealed a very rule-bound and prescriptive understanding of interpreting ethics
(Dean, 2014 & 2015), those data had to be reconsidered in light of the potential concerns flagged by moral
psychology researchers—that is, relying solely on interview data as a “window into the moral mind” (CSED, n.d.)
is flawed.
Much of what interpreters use to justify decisions can be found in what is cognitively available from traditional
normative messages (Dean, 2014). Posing the same types of questions to interpreters results in formulaic and
predictable answers. Those answers may not accurately reflect a person’s reasoning capabilities because the formulaic
answers may well be governed by tacit processes—that is, these predictable questions may summon a moral schema
that might not be a true reflection of the participant’s dominant moral schema. However, if interpreters are provided
with a different type of question, outside the predictable ones, then they might not follow a well-worn discursive
pathway (Dean, 2014 & 2015). Instead, they might reveal their greater ethical reasoning capacity.
The cohort of interpreters (n = 25) who agreed to the follow-up study completed an online version of the DIT2. As part of the DIT-2 data collection, respondents were asked to input demographic data, such as gender, age, and
highest level of education. The average age of the cohort was 49 years, more than half had an undergraduate degree
or above, and all but one held national- or state-level qualification.
The average PCS or P-score for the interpreting practitioners was 33.6. As shown in Table 5.1, when compared
to age and educational attainment, their PCS or P-scores and PIS were similar to those in their early 20s, yet
their average age was more than double that. Notably, their MNS scores were the highest, at 35.0, making this the
dominant moral schema of the group. Their average MNS score was commensurate with that of teenagers, making
them appear even younger than their PCS and PIS scores indicated. A dominant MNS schema means that as a
collective, they were most frequently compelled by arguments that focused on maintaining the rules and following
one’s duties—that is, “[t]hey appear to think that following the rule will yield a moral result—that the rule contains
the moral ideal” (Dean, 2015, p. 207).
Comparing the interpreters’ P-scores to those of other professionals (and their students) yielded similarly
unexpected results (see Table 5.2). Not only did the interpreters not even make it on the list of the other
professionals; they scored lower than adults in general (a P-score of 40.0) and closer to seniors in high school
(a P-score of 31.8). These unexpected results prompted the following questions: Does the prescriptive nature of
interpreting ethics come to influence interpreters’ broader perception of ethical behavior? Or does the interpreting
profession, because of its frequently rule-bound normative messages, attract those who already have a propensity
for prescription? As students, do interpreters arrive with a prescriptive, duty, and rule-bound perspective on
ethical action? Accessing the DIT scores of interpreting students was the most direct way to get help in answering
these questions.

7. Methodology and Results
7.1.		

Individual DITs: Study 1

Third-year interpreting majors enrolled in a 4-year program in the northeastern United States were asked to
participate in this study. Approximately 30 students across two sections of an interpreting ethics course took a
paper-and-pencil version of the DIT-2. This study was repeated in their ethics class, using about 1 hour of class time
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for the fall semesters of 2016, 2017, and 2018. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was granted for the three
iterations of this DIT study.
The same protocol was used for each iteration of the study: Test booklets, answer sheets, and number two pencils
were distributed to all students. Each student created a code name, one that would be unique to them and not easily
guessed by their classmates or their instructors (e.g., the name of a pet or a special date). They were instructed to
write that code name on the answer sheet and to remember or write it down for safekeeping. This code name was
then linked with a random number code used by the researchers and written in the text field of the answer sheets.
A key was created that linked the students’ chosen code names and the researchers’ assigned numbers. The answer
sheets were sent to CSED, where they were scored. The scores were returned by email approximately 1 week later.
The results of the DIT included individual scores and the group’s aggregate score. The aggregate scores were
presented to the whole class; after that, students were asked to claim their individual scores, which were laid out on
folded sheets of paper, identified only by the code name. Students were encouraged not to share or ask each other
about their individual scores because a higher P-score is considered “better.” Time was allowed for a discussion as
well as an explanation of what the DIT can say about moral reasoning and the DIT’s limitations (Bebeau & FaberLangendoen, 2014).
7.2.		 Results: Study 1
Table 7.2.1 lists the cohorts from all 3 years and their P-scores, which represent PCS.
Table 7.2.1: Mean score of each P-score for third-year students in 2016, 2017, and 2018
Interpreting students 2016		
Interpreting students 2017		
Interpreting students 2018		

n = 31		
n = 32		
n = 27		

Mean P-score (PCS) 		
Mean P-score (PCS) 		
Mean P-score (PCS) 		

45.1
47.3
41.9

The P-scores for all three classes are higher than the average P-score of 33.6 for the practicing interpreter
cohort in 2013 (Dean, 2015). Table 7.2.2 adds the students’ PIS, MNS, and PCS scores within the table of normed
DIT data for undergraduate students.
Table 7.2.2: Newer normed DIT data for each university year for college students (CSED, n.d.)
University year			

Average PIS		

Average MNS		

Average PCS

First year: freshman		26.5			34.3			34.1
Second year: sophomore
25.7			34.3			35.2
Third year: junior		24.9			35.5			34.9
Fourth year: senior		23.7			35.7			35.9
2016 students			24.8			24.4			45.1
2017 students			25.5			22.3			47.3
2018 students			27.8			23.4			41.9
Comparatively, all classes of interpreting students did better than their peers in PCS (the P-score). They also had
much lower scores for MNS compared to their peers. They also were at least 10 points lower (i.e., better) than the
mean for the practicing interpreters, who had an MNS score of 35.0. Their PIS scores were more comparable to those
of their peers and in 2018 were slightly higher than those of their peers.
Table 7.2.3 combines all P-scores from students and practitioners and compares them to other students and
practitioners from other professions.
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Table 7.2.3: Comparing interpreting student cohorts, interpreter practitioners, and other professionals
P-score			Group
65.2			
Moral philosophy and political science graduate students
52.2			Law students
50.2			Medical students
49.2			Practicing physicians
47.3			
Interpreting students (2017)
46.3			Staff nurses
45.1			
Interpreting students (2016)
42.3			
College students in general
41.9			
Interpreting students (2018)
40.0			
Adults in general
33.6			
Interpreter practitioners (2013)
31.8			
Senior high school students
In every year that the DIT was administered, the interpreting students did better than their practitioner
counterparts, scoring within the realm of other professionals and graduate students. Therefore, the answer to the
question that arose out of the lower-than-expected scores of the practitioners—are interpreters conventional thinkers
because they arrive to educational programs already ensconced in a rule-bound perspective on ethical action?—
appears to be no.
7.3.

Collective DITs: Study 2

In 2017, we added a follow-up component to the individually administered DIT. In addition to each student’s
taking the DIT-2 individually, they also took it as a group, with a negotiated answer to each ethical scenario recorded
on the DIT answer sheet. This collective version of the DIT was conducted before the students were informed of their
class’s aggregate score or their individual scores. This study was also approved by the university’s IRB.
A total of seven groups, each with four or five members, was created based on the members’ individual scores.
Every attempt was made to balance the groups as much as possible—that is, a balanced number of P scores in the 30s,
40s, 50s, and so forth as well as a balanced number of students. This quasi-matched design was relatively effective;
however, in at least two cases, students were absent on the day that the collective DIT was administered. In those
cases, groups were missing members and representative scores. This quasi-matched design was not known to the
students because at this point, none of the students was aware of the scores. Code names were used to divide the
students, which to them likely appeared to be random.
Approximately seven students had scored in the high range of the DIT’s principled reasoning or P-score (60 or
above). Each group included one of the high scorers, who was assigned to be the group’s leader. The leaders were
given unique instructions, which are explained later. The scenario and the three questions were read aloud by each
leader to each group of students. The group was asked to deliberate and come to consensus for each of the three
questions across the five scenarios of the DIT-2. The DIT-2 ends with a series of demographic questions; for the
collective responses, these questions were skipped. Throughout the 45- to 60-minute process, we kept tabs on each
group’s progress. If a group was running behind, they were asked to be cognizant of the time they were spending in
deliberating over and negotiating answers.
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Certainly, not all students participated equally in the deliberative process. This is not dissimilar from what might
happen in an ethics course where students are asked to discuss some ethical issue pertaining to interpreting. In that
way, it could be argued that the processes are similar. No special instructions were given to the students to make this
process any different from what might naturally occur in class.
One question that was intriguing was whether the high scorers would have a stronger influence on the deliberative
group process if they knew that they were high scorers. To answer this question, the leaders (i.e., high scorers) were
placed in two groups with the conditions of tell and no tell.
The first section of the ethics class had five groups and, therefore, five leaders. Two of the five leaders were asked
to get one test booklet, one answer sheet, and a pencil for their group. Those two leaders were given those items and
sent back to their groups. This was the no-tell condition. Next, the other three leaders were called up and given the
test items and then told quietly that they were high scorers (without being told their exact scores) and that, as such,
they should make their opinions heard in the group. They were told not to tell anyone about their high-scorer status
and encouraged not to dominate the discussion but to just make sure they expressed their opinions. They agreed and
were sent back to their groups. This was the tell condition. The very same design occurred in the second section
except, with only two groups in the smaller class, one was the tell condition and one was the no-tell condition. With
a total of seven groups from two sections of the ethics course, four groups were the tell condition and three groups
were the no-tell condition.
The collective DITs with negotiated scores were coded to designate group numbers, and the answer sheets were
sent by mail to the CSED. The CSED scored them and returned the results in PDF through email about a week later.
A presentation of the individual and collective scores was delivered toward the end of the semester; all students were
informed of the study’s outcome.
7.4.

Results: Study 2

The 2017 third-year class, a total of 32 students, was unique in having the highest P-scores but also the largest range
of P-scores. The high scorer got a 70, while the low scorer got a 20. Every effort was made to create quasi-balanced
groups (see column 2 in Table 7.4.1). Column 2 in Table 7.4.1 lists each group’s individual scores, with at least
a 30-point difference between the lowest scorer and the highest scorer. Column 3 contains each group’s median
P-score. The median is preferred over the mean because of the significant spread in P-scores in the 2017 cohort.
Column 4 shows the results of the negotiated P-scores, and column 5 shows each group’s gain from the median
P-score to the higher negotiated score.
Table 7.4.1: Comparison and analysis of the individual DIT and collective DIT
Group 1
Groups

1. 62
2. 48
Individual
P-scores
3. 44
4. 34
5. 30

44
Median P-sccore

66
Negotiated P-score

+22
Gains in P-score

Group 2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

68
52
46
36
34

46

58

+12

Group 3

1.
2.
3.
4.

72
48
48
32

48

60

+12
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Group 4

1.
2.
3.
4.

64
42
38
34

40

54

+14

Group 5

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

68
56
36
32
20

36

48

+12

Group 6

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

66
48
44
36
26

44

48

+04

Group 7

1.
2.
3.
4.

68
56
46
40

51

54

+03

In every instance, the negotiated P-score was better than the median P-score, with gains ranging from 3 points
to 22 points. The average gain was 11.3 points (with a median and mode of 12 points), a significant difference by the
sign test (p = .008). In other words, collective DIT takers scored reliably higher than individual DIT takers.
As mentioned above, four groups across the two sections of ethics class were led by those who knew they were
the high scorers (the tell condition). Three of the groups were led by those who did not have any knowledge as
to their high-score status or why they were chosen as leaders. This was to test whether or not the leader’s ethical
strength (as defined by the DIT) and influence would explain any potential gains or whether it was more likely the
result of the deliberative process. Table 7.4.2 reveals which groups were in the tell groups versus the no-tell groups
and the gains in their P-scores:
Table 7.4.2: Tell and no-tell conditions and their effects
Tell
Group 1

√

Group 2
Group 3

√

Group 7

√

14
12

√
√

12
12

√

Group 6

Differential in scores
22

√

Group 4
Group 5

No tell

04
03

The average increase in the no-tell condition (groups 2, 4, and 6) was 10, while the average increase in the tell
condition (groups 1, 3, 5, and 7) was 12.3. This is not a statistically significant difference. Although the sample size
is too small to rule out an effect of high-score knowledge, an actual difference of between 10 and 12.3 is arguably
minimal, suggesting that the leaders did not overly influence the P-score outcomes of their groups. The gains can
therefore be assumed to have come from the deliberative process—collectively discussing, conferring, and settling
on the best moral answer.
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8. Conclusions, Limitations, and Further Research
Posing ethical scenarios as a means of eliciting ethical thought can be indicative of something, but it would be
wrong to assume that it is indicative of moral reasoning abilities. As such, it cannot be assumed that the two different
student responses in the faculty member’s story meant much of anything, at least not in everyday application.
Individuals need some verbal assistance to express what they are capable of cognitively. The DIT was designed to
specifically offer that assistance.
When working interpreters were given that verbal assistance, it did not appear to elevate their expressions of
principled reasoning. If the normative messages of the interpreting profession consistently reflect a rigid, maintainingnorms approach to ethics, then perhaps their conventional reasoning at work bled over into their broader moral
reasoning in life. This was one of the considered conclusions of Dean’s (2015) study, now reconsidered with greater
credence, given the results of this study. In other words, because the students consistently scored higher than those
in their age group, and the working interpreters scored much lower, is it possible to consider that exposure to
professional discourse over their years of practice made them this way? The data showed that interpreting students
consistently scored better than practitioners, even without their age and educational advantages. Therefore, the
hypothesis of the profession’s attracting conventional thinkers is not born out by these data.
Interpreting students also did better on average when they worked together to negotiate responses than when
they worked alone. The results of this second study on collective DITs are encouraging because they appear to add
some evidence to the traditional design of group discussion and deliberation employed in ethics courses and in
professional development techniques, such as case report and case analysis, often used in the reflective practice of
supervision (Curtis, 2017; Dean & Pollard, 2011, 2013; Hetherington, 2011; Interpreting Institute for Reflection-inAction and Supervision, n.d.).
The generalizability of these data has limitations. The program in which all students were enrolled espouses a
type of ethics across the curriculum design. Demand control schema (DC-S), a work analysis and decision-making
tool, is taught from the beginning of the program and either reinforced throughout or used more extensively in
subsequent courses. DC-S directly teaches principled reasoning—it requires an assessment of the context, including
the values of the setting and a consideration of each stakeholder’s communication aims and preferences (Dean &
Pollard, 2011, 2013). It also encourages behavioral flexibility as a means of working cooperatively toward shared
values (Dean & Pollard, 2011, 2013). This study was not designed to investigate the impact of DC-S on DIT scores,
although that could be a topic for future research. A follow-up study with these students-now-practitioners to
measure to what degree their reasoning patterns might have shifted, as is evidenced in other professions, has been
discussed. Future research should also seek to increase the reliability of the data by replicating the study with greater
diversity in types of interpreters (e.g., signed language interpreters in other countries, interpreters who work as deaf
interpreters, and spoken language interpreters) in addition to greater sample sizes. Lastly, it would be useful to use
the DIT to account for the reasoning abilities of teachers and mentors who influence students’ ethical-reasoning
skills.
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